

ENERGY STRATEGY OF RUSSIA AND ITS IMPACT ON EUROPE

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Abstract

This article explains the energy strategy of Russia and its impact on Europe. The disintegration of the USSR resulted in a weak military and defense industry which is fundamentally critical for regaining the status of global super power. To substitute the weak defense industry, energy sector was the alternate option that could ensure collecting enough revenue to finance the country achieve regional and then global dominance. The monopoly of the state over production and distribution of its natural resources providing energy helped Russia dominate the region and the regional policies pertaining to energy. The significant gas pipelines between Russia and European Union passes through countries previously part of the Russia that makes the country intensely reliant on these states as energy transportation arbitrators. To guarantee a consistent energy supply and diminish Russia's dependence on travel nations, Russia is looking for alternative approaches to expand the gas supply lines entering into the European Union. The federation is prepared to take any steps that could result in bypassing these states and provide energy directly to Europe. The monopolistic control of Russia on gas supplies to Europe could help achieve regional dominance. Compromising a chance of unexpected energy disturbance and cost dictation can be a productive apparatus of state power to accomplish Russia's political targets.

Keywords: Russia, European Union, Energy, and Transportation Routes.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the demise of the USSR, Russia has been preparing to retake the glory it once had as a global player. To do so, the country is looking for ways to attain dominance in the global markets and control the region as a major power. One of the pathways to restore the previous glory is by dominating the European markets and becoming the region's biggest energy supplier. The article analyzes how Russian control over gigantic energy potential affects the formation of the country's present international strategy, especially vis-à-vis the E.U and the individual nations of Europe which are vigorously reliant on Russia to fulfil their energy needs. The article will build up a notion that a customer's overwhelming reliance on a provider's energy assets may transform the last into a financial instrument of political compulsion and evaluate the energy market of Europe and the level of its dependence on the energy supplies of Russia. The disintegration of the USSR, trailed by financial as well as administrative disturbance, left the country with weak defense and military sector that is fundamentally essential for its regional and global dominance. The impediment is attainable if the military reliance is substituted by energy distribution that could help raise finance for the country which is essential for achieving its strategic objectives. Accordingly, the state control of energy production and distribution network can help Russia take control of activities in the region that interest

Russia and its interests and act as a tool of power for the state [1].

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Russian federation is willing to invest in projects that can bypass the current supply line and supply through an independent pipeline that the country controls even if there is a high price for the venture.

This will reduce its reliance on the previous Soviet nations, specifically on Ukraine, through which majority of gas is supplied throughout Europe. The new energy supply pattern will pave the way toward less reliability in a single state for its distribution network. Russia will have alternative routes for its distribution network if there is a disruption of energy supply through the existing passage [3]. Compromising the chance of unexpected energy disturbance and value control, Russia could raise its political dominance in the region by dictating its terms to beneficiary states. As such, economic influence could become a proficient device of state capacity in accomplishing its political goals [4].

2. METHODOLOGY

The primary technique for assessment of the research is the use of Realism and Constructivism theories on global associations that Russia seeks towards the individual beneficiary states in European Union, and the post-Soviet region.

3. ECONOMIC DIMENSION

Since the demise of the USSR, Russian ambitions of becoming the global superpower have taken a new dimension. The focus of Russian international and economic strategy shifted from the military to the energy sector. The shift was motivated by Russian fast economic development and stability subsequently following the confusion and strife of post-cold war era. The general sentiment is that it became conceivable, given the presence of another age of leadership that are receptive and liberated from the Soviet mindset, and that to regain the previous glory, they develop a unique strategy apart from military might [5].

One significant factor driving the current Russian international strategy is presenting economic courses of action. The economy of Russia is export oriented. Around 85% of its income originates from exporting crude materials, for example, metals, timber, gas, and oil. Russia has around 30% of the global gas stores and oil reserves of around 6%. Moscow's primary mineral buyers are the previous Soviet nations and lucrative E.U states. Since it acquired advanced gas and oil pipeline frameworks from the Soviet Union, Moscow didn't need to put resources into developing energy transportation courses [6].

Economic and Political dimensions of Russia are linked. In Putin administration, the country recaptured authority over major companies and the people closely associated with Putin were selected to maintain those business properties and enterprises (Dawisha, 2011). The inner circle of Putin and Russian oligarchs turned out to be his colleagues in the Saint Petersburg city and KGB administration. Consequently, the individuals selected for high administrative and business places had similar ideas and values that had been formed during the Soviet period. The clearest instance of interlaced economic-political relationship is Medvedev (previous president of Russia), who worked in Saint Petersburg with Putin. In 2012, the country revisited the energy policy and devised a plan till 2035 to be acted upon in two phases; one from 2012 till 2020 and another till 2035, which both optimistic and pessimistic strategies (Alexander, Alekseev et al., 2019). The strategy is based on achieving economic goals and setting up a European monopoly so that Russia can dominate the regional market and dictate its terms to the member states [7].

4. ENERGY REPLACES MILITARY POWER

Even though the political leadership of Russia figured out how to solidify the populace behind the modern foreign strategy, Moscow is probably not going to satisfy its global dominance desires by utilizing its defense sector as the method for power projection. The military of Russia is in decay in the course of the most recent two decades since the disassembling of the Soviet Union (Hedlund, 2011). Reliance on the atomic weapons arsenal will not help propel national interests abroad. The best way it could be utilized for military prevention is to keep up the state of affairs with hard powers. Help the idea of political that foreign strategy effectiveness relies upon the level of power inclusion, a viable replacement for a hard power plan could be found in controlling energy supplies that not only have significant financial repercussions yet likewise an authoritative political device (Goldman, 2010) [8].

If Moscow's regular hard power can be utilized to extend capacity and bolster its state benefits outside borders, as was seen in 2008 during the Tbilisi-Moscow unrest, at that point, its gigantic resources, current pipeline framework, and geographical landscape gave the former USSR a preferred position. Russia can get an advantage from these resources and use as weapons to expand itself. (Zimmerman, 2009), particularly in Europe, which as of now, is the biggest lucrative exporter of hydrocarbons, particularly gas (Closson, 2009). Europe has few choices to fulfill its energy demands other than Moscow, which makes it hard not to rely on Russia as the biggest energy provider [9]. These circumstances offer leeway to Russia concerning price control (Hedlund, 2011). Besides, energy supply could be interrupted for any reason, which would seriously harm customers' need and pay the price in its domestic strength, as it occurred when the Russia-Ukraine gas emergency during 2009. Consequently, concerning E.U. nations, "the leaders of the West would need to reconsider before opposing the political requests of the provider" (Goldman, 2010) [10].

Russia local real-political strength come from financial assets, specifically, its natural assets compared to military methods, comes from the present political administration. Putin has made it clear that the state has the right to develop and direct the energy in the way it deems suitable to fulfill the wider national interest. The Russian economy has been isolated for

quite a long time compared to other developed markets to have the option to rapidly make up for technologically and contend successfully on a global level. Even though foreign financial specialists were invited, Putin confirmed that the legislature must hold working control of the assets instead of privatization of the energy sector of the country [11].

5. EUROPE AND RUSSIA INTERDEPENDENCE

A straightforward clarification of monetary relations between market players is that a customer and a provider are commonly keen on exchanging products to expand trade (Wheelan, 2010). In this regard, energy trade or reliance between Europe and Russia should be advantageous to providers and purchasers. The mutual benefits for both nations come in the form that Europe needs energy supplies to fulfill their needs, and Russia needs finance to sponsor its global dominance. The primary revenue generation source of Moscow is hydrocarbons export, and the main to connection is that lucrative of Russia's clients are Italy and Germany (Closson, 2009). Russia "gets" itself "monetarily rely on Europe" (Ericson, 2009), and Europe intensely depends on cleaner energy [12].

The least expensive approach to supply the gas from pipeline, when it has been built. Pipeline development requires gigantic funding which take normally takes as long as 25-year promises from purchasers/clients of the energy to buy enough to legitimize improvement costs. A pipeline "genuinely" associates the dealer and the purchaser, it gives a provider "colossal market power" over its customer because of the structure price for a pipeline for a low minor cost per unit of energy shipped (Ericson, 2009). For the situation of Europe-Russia energy relations, the current gas transportation framework was worked during the Soviet times; and Moscow, having stayed away from the need for significant ventures contribution to pipelines development, showed up in a place of the compelling imposing business model over energy assets spilling from Asia to Europe as a result of an absence of other significant elective courses interfacing the previous and the latter [13].

Every European nation looks for the ideal ways that could be available to ensure its national advantages. That additionally applies to energy security. Monetary

imbalance in European Union and each state's extraordinary topographical location influence how much to acquire energy assets to run their markets proficiently. Verifiably industrialized E.U. economies, for instance, Italy, France, and Germany require large quantities of energy supply to cover their demands compared to industrially smaller states. For example, after the 2011 Fukushima tragedy, the German political administration chose to close down its atomic plants before 2023 (Spiegel Online, 2012) and, step by step, replace them with "green" gas, principally from Russia. On the other hand, countries like Poland and France are reducing their reliance on external energy providers and concentrating on in-house atomic power-production facilities. In this manner, prioritization of the monetary interests by the E.U. nations over combined ones unavoidably sabotages the E.U.'s ability to act viably as a solitary voice to manage any difficulties that this political substance may confront [14].

To ensure demand of energy in the E.U. gas market, Russia has signed long-term energy contracts with various European nations on a "take-or-pay" premise. Any change in plan will cost heavily. Former Soviet knows to landlock E.U. is dependent on its energy because they will not find any solution to overcome its energy need in a short period of timing LNG could be a choice, yet its monetary reasonability is dicey now, given the significant expense of LNG transportation and terminal development. Russia appreciates a "natural imposing business model" on gas supply to certain E.U. nations for at least 10–15 years, implying that they would stay dependent upon the energy assets of Russia in the close term until a powerful replacement is viable. The fundamental worry of the. The strategy of E.U is provide energy and it security. Enhancement of supplies as a key component of the energy security strategy (Closson, 2009) can be accomplished distinctly through the realization of "market rules and rivalry standards," (Aalto, 2009) permitting different players reasonable access to the energy market resources, including Gazprom [15].

Russia has entered into long-term contracts with European Union member states via Gazprom to take hold of the energy supply throughout Europe. It is also investing directly in other energy-related projects in Africa, Latin America, the Caspian Basin, and the Middle East (Closson, 2009). To keep up the energy supply and meet the consistently expanding Russia is

purchasing gas from the Caspian Sea and its neighbors because of the high demand from the E.U. and it cannot fulfill the current demand (Overland, 2009). Additionally, while various gas fields of Russia stay undiscovered, foreign financial specialists are not invited to upgrade new fields without local partnerships. Russia demands collaboration in these ventures with state-controlled organizations, especially Gazprom. In any case, the Putin regime overwhelms investors, forcing impediments by specific utilization of the enactment (Pleines, 2009). Traditional arguments against the inclusion of foreign investments are the dispute that "foreign investment has frequently been viewed as giving outside unjustified investor impact within one's nation" and could be deciphered as an "infringement of sovereignty" (Quester, 2007). In this regard, investor commitment in the market of Russia would mean its progression and, as a result, a debilitated state restraining infrastructure over distribution, and transportation the basic energy source that may be utilized as an instrument of compulsion [16].

6. KEY CHALLENGES FOR EUROPE

6.1 Diversifications prospects

To reestablish its reputation for being a solid energy provider to Europe after the 2009 cut-offs, Moscow reliably convinced the E.U. concerning the need to accelerate the development of the Southern project that is to associate Europe and Russia, bypassing Kyiv, which is at present the significant travel nation for the Former Soviet energy supply to Europe. Moscow did not force its stance by criticizing Kyiv as being inconstant in satisfying assumed travel commitments (Pirani, 2009). Hence, Russia demands that the energy supply through "antagonistic" transit countries should unquestionably stay away from it. Cost assessment of the pipeline development over the base of the Black Sea, around €24 billion (Socor, 2009), sensibly questions the financial capability of the project: it would not supply any additional gas to E.U.; to sidestep Ukraine, 63 billion cubic meters would be redirected from the transit structure of Ukraine (Aseeva, 2010) [17]. Altogether, the South Stream supplemented by the North Stream with 55 bcm of gas transportation limit per annum would have the option to annul noteworthiness of the Ukrainian pipeline,

which at present records for transportation of around 120 bcm of gas to E.U. purchasers yearly [18].

The Nabucco pipeline project aims do not depended on Moscow gas. With an assessed yearly supply limit of 31 bcm, the Nabucco project additionally falls into a system of the Solidarity and Energy Security Action Plan of the E.U. that proposes the "building up a southern gas way for the supply from Caspian and Middle Eastern region" (Europa, 2009) and became "leader project" of the E.U. energy security strategy.[19] Even though its development is less expensive than the South project, despite everything, question whether in advance investments would provide a prompt yield as Nabucco faces significant problems in running the channeling if sufficient assets are found to meet the pipeline with gas. At first, Teheran was viewed a significant energy supplier for Nabucco. Yet, because of continuous questions on the Iranian atomic program, Iranian natural gas will probably not be utilized until the emergency is finished. The elective approach to get the essential volume of gas for the Nabucco pipeline would be an entrance to the fossil assets of previous Soviet republics in Central Asia. [20] Up until this point, that choice is not practical for two reasons. Initially, the contradiction over the authentic status of the Caspian between its coastal nations, regardless of whether it should be considered as an ocean or a lake – is as yet uncertain, which does not permit the development of a pipeline on the base of the Caspian. The last is that Moscow "tied up accessible and future gas supplies in long-period Gazprom agreements" (Ericson, 2009). Therefore, even though Nabucco's expansion alternative bodes well, it will probably not be actualized in the near future because of the absence of obvious solutions for afforested troubles rapidly [21]. Africa and the Middle East are some of the other energy stations. These alternative stations of energy are achievable and as expensive as others. LNG projects are very expensive and require significant advanced investment and duties by the consumers and producers. Supplying regular LNG depends upon liquefaction and de-gasification facilities. The arrangement of long-period contracts and their steady restoration should be set up to guarantee the security of interest. Both matters of supply and security are key factors that specify the certainty of high-fixed expenses for the LNG decision [22]. Other than that, if LNG is economically practical for the nations with

the sea to get quick, this alternative barely makes economic logic for the land-bolted nations, specifically for the central states of Europe, which now acquire energy supplies from Moscow by means of pipelines. Along these lines, because of the high expense required to build the LNG framework, predicted that the gas market of the EU which is now at around 20%, would stay modest for what it's worth throughout the following couple of decades. To be sure, somewhat LNG would lessen developing reliance on Russia's gas, particularly for the West E.U. nations. Yet, it will probably not adjust the existing uneven relationship in the Russia-European Union energy cooperation [23].

6.2 Common Energy Strategy

The energy triangle of Russia, the European Union, and European states needs to work together to manage the energy crisis in the region (Aalto, 2009). The E.U. endeavors to work an "integrator motor" to implement the shape of a typical gas and oil security strategy in inward and outer measurements, expecting to make a one-sided approach by the E.U. nations to withstand simultaneous heterogeneous energy reliance on Russian fossil fuels assets. In reality, Russian-European energy cooperation throughout Europe increased certain novel qualities after the appearance of another player, specifically the E.U. that progresses a unified energy strategy for the benefit of the E.U. nations without importing gas (Solanko, Laura and Pekka, 2009) [24]. Simultaneously, implementing the bound together methodology towards combining the security of energy is frequently in strife with these types of energy partnerships, especially with Russia and European nations. After the disintegration of the USSR, a significant revisit on the E.U. political chart, alongside the arrival of fresh players perceive for energy transit nations and the formation of E.U., called for the amendment of the current energy strategy. This amendment aimed for new courses of action for energy collaboration between the E.U. and different nations. Toward the start of the 1990s, the E.U. propelled an activity with a reason to "build a legitimate establishment for oil and gas security, in light of the standards of open, modest markets and maintainable development. The idea has been revealed in ECT (Energy Charter Treaty) with an essential accentuation on the improvement of normal principles

to give a more adjusted and proficient structure for global collaboration than is offered by reciprocal understanding. In 1994 treaty was signed by fifty-one nations, most of them from the E.U. nations, Russia and other countries (Moldova Turkey, and Ukraine) [25].

The disappointment of dealings with former USSR over substance of the Energy Charter Treaty incited E.U. to look for some types of energy collaboration with Russia. At the "Summit of E.U.-Russia in 2000," it was consented to start a separate Russia-E.U. Energy Dialog (Ferran, 2009). The E.U. Commission, as an international authority, was commanded by the E.U. nations to offer the Russian government a true reciprocal type of energy cooperation. Moreover, to "financial, technical, and institutional help" provisioned by the Charter Agreement, the E.U. offered Russia to "take an interest in the improvement of the E.U.'s joint market" (Closson, 2009). Simultaneously discussion in the structure of the Russia-E.U Energy Dialog is consistently intense when the matter of fossil assets is raised. While Moscow looks for "long-period agreements for gas, technology and investment, cooperation in the E.U. Investment Bank, and evacuating limited ban on imports of items related to energy," the E.U., to improve the security of delivery, tries the "opening energy market of Russia" and reasonable circumstances for investments [26].

To additionally build up a consistent multilateral methodology towards combining energy security, in 2008, the E.U. followed a combined action plan highlighting the inadequacy of "explicit national arrangements" according to "the coordination of energy markets and frameworks in the E.U." and the need to "build up a plan for 2050" (Europa: Please Releases RAPID). Simultaneously, a consistent increase in energy utilization throughout the E.U. raised genuine environmental worries highlighted in the energy and climate package of E.U." The package predicts a decrease of 20% in greenhouse emissions, "20% of E.U. energy utilization starts from renewable energy," and a decrease by 20% "in essential energy use contrasted and anticipated levels by refining energy proficiency" [27].

6.3 European and Central Asia Energy Security

With the present policy to control the E.U. energy market (Ericson, 2009), Moscow also searches eastbound for broad energy participation with energy needing East Asian and Chinese economies (Poussenkova, 2009). Key components of the energy policy of eastern fixed in "Eastern Gas Program" by the Russian Federation Industry in 2007. The program predicts the advancement of energy fields and gas production development in Russian Eastern Siberia to fulfill requirements for gas by potential East Asian clients and Chinese (Gazprom) [28].

China's economic boom set the most adaptable and exceptionally monetarily position for Russia to develop energy links with China. Similarly, Beijing also sees Moscow as a significant future energy partner for a few significant reasons. To begin with, the strategic importance of their topographical nearness allows for associating upstream and downstream ventures with lower costs and evading dependence on mediators. Second, Beijing is worried about broadening energy sector and its use. China is blame for its CO₂ producer due to local energy production from coal; subsequently, it facing worldwide pressure on environmental matters (Indra and Kyrre, 2009). As of now, no choice has been made after the development of gas pipelines [29]. The primary issue is that both sides cannot agree on the price of natural gas. China wants lower prices accentuating the need to keep up a rivalry with the elective source of local energy production, specifically coal. Russia then again endeavors to help China through "long-period agreements for the gas supply." As the government of Russia brought up, such a long-period promise is "the reason for the choice on the construction of a pipeline" (Poussenkova, 2009) [30]. The absence of agreement over the price of gas with Russia and uncertainty over future power of gas collaboration with Moscow induced Beijing to depend more on elective sources of energy, incorporating those in the nations of Central Asia, to be specific Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan (Xuanli, 2006). Right now, Turkmenistan has the world's fourth-biggest gas reserves (Reuters, 2012) "; it is the main in the region which supplies its hydrocarbons to Beijing, (Bloomberg News, 2011) with an anticipated export yearly limit of 40 bcm (Gorst, Isabel, and Geoff, 2009). At the same time, China is discussing gas

supply with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In 2011, Kazakhstan and China agreed to propel a pipeline development that would connect the gas fields of Kazakhstan with the current transportation system, which begins in Turkmenistan and passes Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and ends in China (Reuters, 2012), and include another 15 bcm of gas for China. Normally, Kazakhstan could expand yearly export volumes to around 40 cm (Financial Times, 2011) [31].

Key ramifications for the E.U. security strategy in extending energy participation among Central E.U. energy suppliers and China are that the volumes of gas would be sufficient for different consumers, explicitly Beijing. Even though Moscow would lose "its higher position as the purchaser of neighbors gas" (Ericson, 2009), it would hold its syndication over transportation from Asia to E.U. and enjoy staying solid over E.U. dependence on Russian petroleum. One more problem face by E.U. energy security may show up if Russia connects East and West Siberia energy fields and if China and Russia would solve the gas price. Moscow would not rely solely on E.U. for its energy deals (Nanay, 2009), and demands for the fossils of Russia and income would be safe in case of politically persuaded disruptions of energy flow to the E.U. market [32].

7 FUTURE POSSIBILITY FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The foreign Strategy of Russia toward Europe weaves together numerous strands of Putin's strategy of arrangement with the Euro-Atlantic group to foster global consistency and support the modernization of Russia. Russia's links with Europe show up fundamentally positive. Europe is not unfriendly to Moscow, nor is it a conceivably undermining military-political organization, similar to NATO. Russian-E.U. trade relations are imperative for the economy of Russia, and Brussels offers substantial assistance and expertise for the economic reforms of Russia. Moreover, as Europe becomes more dependent on Russian energy supplies, Moscow is not the only reliant party in the relationship. Relations between the E.U. and Russia can satisfy Russia's requirement for outer interlocutors that accommodate a Russian voice on the worldwide stage and back Russia's inner transformation.

The mix of E.U. development and the association's rise as a security player, in any case, raises problems for Russia, the first being doubt. The leadership of Russia is unsure of Europe's future part and its strategies toward Moscow. In the long term, is a coalition in Europe taking shape? By what method will the new nations influence the E.U.'s strategy toward Moscow? Will Europe make more efforts to meddle in Russia's local matters? To what degree will Russia have the option to exploit links with the old partners? There are no suitable and clear answers to these questions [33]. The second problem is psychological, even though Putin does not want to be isolated on the E.U.'s periphery, subject to growth beyond its ability to control. Europe extension obscures the distinction between the E.U. and the possibility of "Europe"; the two ideas are combined. For all his realism, Putin has constantly confirmed Russia-European work and attached Russia's new Federation's destiny to that of Europe. Collaboration between a previous domain in retreat and a growing force cannot be required come without problems. The border areas between Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus will probably include friction as lines of influence and power become clearer. This was clear in Moscow's reactions to the discussions in Brussels (2003) when Europe discussed an ESDP operation to supplant the Russian-drove peacekeeping operation in Moldova (Dov, 2003). In public, Russia responded calmly against the thought; in private, Moscow's reactions were a mix of concern, anxiety, and astonishment.

Putin started his presidency seeking more unsurprising and pleasing universal partners for Russia's state consolidation. The E.U. had pride of spot in his vision. The E.U. remains capricious, and Russia is minimal more locked in. Indeed, Russia finds itself pushed to the sidelines, confronting the truth that a unified Europe is being worked at the beginning of the twenty-first century—however, without Russia [34].

The recent Russo-Ukrainian conflict has also changed the region's dynamics and regional coordination. As Russia is highly reliant on Ukraine to supply gas to Europe through its pipelines, the future of the conflict will determine the outcome of energy supply in the region. As reported by the European Commission Quarterly, the Russian energy supply was over 41% of the total revenue. On the other hand, the dependence of Europe on Russian gas has also increased because of the dependence on green fuels and the stoppage of

greenhouse emission sources like coal (Boehm, 2022). The war's outcome could be anything but will deeply affect the trade relationship and energy reliance between Russia and the European Union. Both sides will be looking for new markets, new collaborations, and new strategies to fulfill their needs and also dominate the market at the same time.

8 EUROPEAN ENERGY PROBLEM AFTER UKRAINE CRISIS

The Ukraine crisis brings about a crisis in the energy sector in Europe and the rise in the prices of gas and oil on the European continent. Europe imposed a gas and oil embargo on Russia, which was done purposefully to reduce the dependence on Russia. No more depending on Russian gas and oil in next couple of years. Europe is the second largest importer of oil. Russia is the world's largest oil exporter, and Europe is the second largest oil importer. US pressures Saudi Arabia and UAE to extract more oil as they are one of the largest exports. Qatar is also a good venue for Europe for gas. The energy minister of Qatar, Saad al-Kaabi, said that Qatar could not fulfill the gap with Russia. Another Middle East nation Iran has the world's largest oil and gas reserves. The US and European Union do not have friendly relations which can overcome the current energy crisis. The Iran nuclear program is a major bone of contention between them. Now, if the US and Europe Union make any deal that will favor Iran. Israel, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are strategic partners in the Middle East and will not welcome any breakthrough. Because Iran's economic condition will improve, Iran will come closer to US and European Union, and it can fast the process of making nuclear bombs, which is not acceptable to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Algeria openly offered to supply gas; the CEO announced the Algeria state energy firm [35].

Russian energy is cheaper for Europe due to the near short distance of the direct pipelines. Now they will not get cheaper and cannot be sold cheaper to the consumer. Which will increase commodity prices, and the political party in power will face its effects in elections. Europe energy is facing challenges for new energy stations, domestic use of energy and supply and demand challenges, rise in the price of energy and its political drawback for political parties in power, the production of items, short-term solutions, the

European Union common purchase of gas and storage. Energy divided the European countries on the import of energy from Russian due to the consumption and need. The ban former USSR was to hit hard its main sources of income. The solution is that Europeans need a common energy policy as they have a common agricultural policy [36].

9 CONCLUSIONS

The foreign strategy of Russia can be clarified by using the theory of political authenticity that portrays world as a radical domain where states use different techniques to survive. As the defense sector of Russia is not stable enough to dominate the global dynamics, there needs to be another tool that the country can take advantage of in order to dominate the regional politics according to the theory. Phenomenal shorts of energy flow from Moscow to E.U. in 2009 led to the utilization of another economic weapon by the country aimed at the European Union that placed its impact on the economic collateral in the region. This served as an economic weapon launched towards Europe that affected the region without any use of military force that affected the region economically rather than from loss of lives in traditional warfare. The reason behind the energy dominance of Russia in the region is that the states in Europe are dependent on the single supplier to fulfil its needs. Russia used its legislative power to control the energy supply organizations that are responsible for the production, storage and transportation and state institution Gazprom established its monopoly in the region as a result. The transactions of energy supply from Russia to European states has empowered the country to dominate the economic conditions of the region and hence its decision making powers are influenced by the dependence of energy supply on Russia. There are, as of now, current and operational energy-transportation courses that associate European consumers and Russian energy fields. Europe needs to devise policies that could result in reducing the dependence on Russian energy and looking for alternative suppliers and methods to fulfil their energy needs. All choices are either capital-escalated and require huge forthright investment or could place the E.U. customers into a more profound energy reliance on Russia, which provides the opportunity to Russia to dominate the decision making of these countries. Improving the

southern energy corridor is considered the main economically and politically feasible choice for the E.U. to differentiate its energy supplies; however, its future is dubious. Certain impediments coming from uncertain issues over the Atomic program of Iran, the agitated issue of the legitimate position of the Caspian sea that doesn't permit interfacing Europe and Central Asia while sidestepping Russia, and as of late, increased energy participation in Asia make it muddled who will give enough energy to legitimize the pipeline development cost. The outcome of the newly developed conflict between the Russians and Ukraine and the role of NATO and the European Union will also determine the future of the Russian energy supply. The new alliances and regional changes resulting from the conflict will affect the Europe-Russia relationship regardless of the war's outcome. In this manner, by supplanting the military as an instrument of national power with economic methods, Russia could depend on the energy substance as dealing tool to seek its goals.

NOMENCLATURE

E.U	European Union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
ESDP	Enterpreurship Skill Development Programme
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ECT	Energy Charter Treaty

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